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Abstract 
 
Smart specialisation is a policy concept that has enjoyed a short but very exciting life!  
Elaborated by a group of academic “experts” in 2008, it very quickly made a significant 
impact on the policy audience, particularly in Europe. Such a success story in such a short 
period of time is a perfect example of “policy running ahead of theory”: while smart 
specialisation seems to be already a policy hit and policy makers show some frenetic 
engagements towards smart specialisation, the concept is not tight in particular as an 
academic concept. Many statements and arguments about smart specialisation have not 
been yet based on a sound base of empirical work so that the plea in favor of smart 
specialisation and the tools and instruments to support a smart specialisation strategy are 
made of more wishes and hopes than of empirical (stylized) facts. There is therefore a 
growing gap between the policy practice and the theory. In this paper, we expose and 
explain the minimal set of arguments and statements that have created this situation of smart 
specialisation having “political salience” which makes policy makers eager to “do it” in spite 
of a modest theoretical framework to guide its application or an adequate evidence base to 
help regulate its implementation. Then we will define a research agenda that addresses 
issues of fundamental understanding, empirical observations and measures and 
operationalization of the assessment of potential for smart specialisation and of the tools to 
realize the potential of the concept.  
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1 - From taboo concept to policy hit  
Smart specialisation is a policy concept that has enjoyed a short but very exciting life.  
Developed by a group of academic “experts” in 2008, it very quickly made a significant 
impact on the policy audience, particularly in Europe.1 In fact the concept is now a key 
element of the EU 2020 innovation plan2 - the Commission has decided to build a platform of 
services (S3) to support regions in their efforts to devise and implement a smart 
specialisation strategy;3 discussions are currently under way about introducing smart 
specialisation as a conditionality clause for structural fund attribution; and the OECD is 
launching an activity for measuring smart specialisation.4 
Such a success story in such a short period of time naturally represents a very pleasing 
result for the academics at the origin of the concept. But it also suggests something that, in a 
sense, helps us to maintain a certain degree of modesty regarding our academic contribution 
to policy discussion. It suggests that the idea had been in the air for some years, decades 
even. But that idea was stifled and repressed as a result of the enormous conformity that has 
characterised innovation policy research and practices over the last decades in many 
international policy forums. The dogma stated that a good, tolerable and honourable policy 
aims to address market failures while not favouring any particular sector or technology based 
on certain “priorities”. According to the dogma, departing from such neutrality is always 
dangerous since it implies guessing the future developments of markets and technologies 
and this opens the door to all those little monsters that economists like to eradicate: wrong 
choices, picking winners, market distortions. According to the dogma, it is much better to 
leave any issue concerning sectoral strategies, specialisation, or direction to the “magical 
chaos of the blind watchmaker”. Any notion of specialisation policy was a taboo in policy 
discussion, particularly in the main policy institutions. 
However, the last two years of crisis that have left many regions and countries with very few 
opportunities for economic recovery and restart and observation of the persistence of many 
coordination failures in systems of innovation as well as huge capacity asymmetries between 
regions and countries have exerted a certain amount of pressure to revise the dogma. Today 
we are witnessing a renaissance of “industrial policy” (of “a competition-friendly sectoral 
policy” to paraphrase P. Aghion). And so the idea of smart specialisation has suddenly 
become very obvious: the simple idea that i) regions cannot do everything in science, 
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technology and innovation and ii) they need to promote what should make their knowledge 
base unique and “superior”.  The idea of smart specialisation has in fact two facets: 
First, it is important to focus on certain domains in order to realise the potential for scale, 
scope and spillovers in knowledge production and use, as these are important drivers of 
productivity in the domain of R&D and other innovation-related activities. Second, it is 
important to focus on certain domains in order to develop distinctive and original areas of 
specialisation for the future. Strongly mimetic regional programmes to promote export 
capacity expansion in certain fashionable high-tech domains or foster industrial 
agglomerations of high-tech firms that duplicate what’s happening in neighbouring states or 
provinces have the effect in the EU setting (and that of other integrated regional systems) of 
dissipating potential gains from agglomeration economies, and vitiating efforts to create 
multiple lines of regional and national specialisation that are sustainably profitable.5 
This very simple idea was already in the air and perhaps all that was needed was just for a 
few academics to lend it some academic legitimacy, which was done in 2008.6 However, the 
simple idea of smart specialisation implies a very complex process in practice, and it is this 
complexity that academics have tried to better analyse and comprehend in order to help 
policy makers understand what is possible, what is feasible, what should be a useful and 
effective policy towards smart specialisation, what are the objectives and what are the tools. 
No less important is how to avoid having such a policy degenerate into the creation of a set 
of rent-capturing entities that prevent (via lobbying, etc.) the useful evolution of the policy 
over time.  
The complexity of the process resides both in discovering the right domains of future 
specialisation and fixing the many coordination failures that can prevent emerging trends 
from becoming real and solid drivers for regional economic growth.  Discovering the right 
domains is by no means trivial and technology foresight exercises or critical technology 
surveys ordered by administrations tend to produce the same ranking of priorities, without 
any consideration of the context and specific conditions of the “client” for whom the exercise 
is carried out. Too many regions have selected the same technology mix – a little bit of ICT, 
a little bit of nano and a little bit of bio – showing a lack of imagination, creativity and strategic 
vision.  The discovery process is thus an issue in its own right. If accomplished properly 
through an entrepreneurial process of discovery (see below), such a process should logically 
identify not necessarily the hottest domains in nanoscience or biotechnology but rather the 
domains where new R&D and innovation projects will complement the country’s other 
productive assets to create future domestic capability and interregional comparative 
advantage. To put it bluntly, a successful smart specialisation strategy will not be found by 
reading the tables of contents of the most recent issue of Science or Nature but rather by 
observing the structures of the economy and supporting the processes of discovery 
undertaken by the firms and other organisations operating in this economy.  
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Fixing coordination failures is another difficult policy challenge. The emergence and growth 
of a new activity, or the transition from an existing activity to a new one, or the extension of 
an existing activity through some kind of diversification, are processes that can be blocked by 
many types of coordination failures among economic agents (suppliers, users, specialised 
services, banks, basic research and training institutions, etc.).7  
 
2 - The economics of smart specialisation: a primer 
Smart specialisation must not be associated with a strategy of the simple industrial 
specialisation of a particular region in tourism or fisheries (to take two fairly low tech sectors 
as an example). Instead, smart specialisation is about R&D and innovation and it might 
suggest that such a region should specialise in R&D and innovation related to the sector of 
tourism or fisheries. This means that smart specialisation is a process addressing the 
missing or weak relations between R&D and innovation resources and activities on the one 
hand and the sectoral structure of the economy on the other. 
A key point is that smart specialisation is not just for the “best” regions and technology 
leaders.  On the contrary, this concept provides strategies and roles for any region. Indeed, 
the concept is built on the fact that there is not only one game in town in terms of R&D and 
innovation; i.e. there are many other kinds of productive and potentially beneficial activities 
apart from the invention of fundamental knowledge needed for the development of general 
purpose technologies and tools (GPTs). There are in fact different logics or orders of 
innovation8. 
Some regions can indeed specialise in the invention of the GPT while others will invest in the 
co-invention of applications to address particular problems of quality and productivity in one 
or a few important sectors of their economies. Co-invention is here an important notion 
because it means that the very act of adopting some ICTs (or any other generic technology) 
to improve operational efficiency or product quality in a given sector of industry or service is 
by no means a simple task. ICT applications are not ready and waiting on the shelf for new 
users. The co-invention of applications actually involves a great deal of R&D, design and 
redesign, i.e. a collection of knowledge-driven activities.  Smart specialisation therefore 
implies rejecting the principle of a sharp division of labour between knowledge producers and 
knowledge users. Any region is facing at least some challenges in terms of improving the 
operational efficiency and product quality of “something” and this is a matter of R&D, 
capabilities, innovation, etc. 
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3 - The anatomy of smart specialisation 
3.1 - A short (hi)story  
By starting with an historical case describing a successful story of smart specialisation, we 
simply want to stress that the phenomenon of smart specialisation is not at all new; what is 
new is the analytical description of the phenomenon which generates a few insights and 
directions concerning policy making. 
In 1796, Pierre-Hyacinthe Caseaux, a merchant and blacksmith in Morez (French Jura), 
“discovered” that he could shift from the production of hob-nails to the production of thin 
metal frames for spectacles, using essentially the same wire-drawing and finishing 
techniques and capabilities upon which his successful business was based. Because eye-
glasses of the fashionable English type at that time had become a product with a very high 
potential for market growth, many others in his former line of business followed Caseaux into 
the production of spectacle-frames, and then into the manufacture of “reading-glasses”; 
numerous small factories specialising in the manufacture of spectacles sprang up in the 
locale during the next 20 years. By the end of the 19th century, Morez was considered one of 
the few world-class centres for the production of eye-glasses and it still holds a considerable 
share of the global market.  The regional authorities had helped the process by funding a 
technical school to train apprentices in this new branch of industry. 
This story exhibits all the ingredients of a successful smart specialisation strategy.  Firstly, it 
is a tale of entrepreneurial discovery of a potential specialisation in which the knowledge 
contributed by the entrepreneur does not concern a technical invention; rather, it relates to 
the fact that a new domain of specialisation might be very beneficial for the locale, given its 
existing productive assets.   Secondly, this is a story about imitative entry: when the initial 
experiment and discovery are successful and diffused, other agents are induced to shift 
investments away from the old domain to the new one. Thirdly, the story concerns policy 
objective and practice, which is not about telling people what to do, what are the right 
specialisations but accompanying emerging trends and improving coordination by providing 
the necessary public goods (education, training) and creating additional incentives at certain 
critical bottlenecks to help the new activity to grow. Fourthly, the outcome of the process is 
much more than a “simple” technological innovation but rather a structural evolution of the 
whole regional economy – in this case the transition from one old, perhaps declining activity 
to a new one offering superior commercial prospects. 
We have simplified the Morez story in order to give salience to the foregoing generic features 
of smart specialisation in practice.9  The historical process, of course, was considerably more 
intricate, and, like the previous business career and decisions made by P.-H. Caseaux, less 
obvious than what has been has been sketched here. The eventual industrial success 
enjoyed by the region therefore should not be thought to have been a high probability event 
that could have been confidently predicted at the end of the 18th century.  Nonetheless, it is 
useful to consider the following stylized rendering of the narrative, which illuminates three 
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important structural elements of a smart specialisation process.  From it several policy 
insights can be derived 
3.2 - Entrepreneurial discovery 
Smart specialisation involves an entrepreneurial discovery process that reveals what a 
country or region does best in terms of R&D and innovation. This principle is so important 
that any model that did not include this provision would have an entirely different character. It 
is important in order to make a clear-cut distinction between the smart specialisation 
approach and some older policy approaches involving centralised planning procedures as 
the main way to identify industrial development priorities. Although these old approaches to 
the problem of prioritisation and resource concentration involved formal exercises based on 
rationalist and robust theories (inter-sectoral matrixes, technological interdependencies and 
hierarchical structures, technological complexities), they were by their very nature largely 
technocratic. Such approaches, which claimed to be very scientific and rational in their ways 
of identifying priorities, targets and objectives, were actually very irrational in their quasi-
ignorance of essential knowledge in this matter, which is entrepreneurial knowledge. 
Entrepreneurial knowledge involves much more than knowledge about science and 
techniques. Rather, it combines and relates such knowledge about science, technology and 
engineering with knowledge of market growth potential, potential competitors as well as the 
whole set of inputs and services required for launching a new activity. The synthesis and 
integration of all this knowledge which is initially dispersed and fragment ted create a vision 
and drive the decision « to go ». It is this type of knowledge that needs to be activated, 
mobilised and supported as the main ingredient of a process of smart specialisation.  
 Smart specialisation fundamentally is based on a process of entrepreneurial discovery. 
Entrepreneurs in a broad sense (firms, higher education institutions, independent inventors 
and innovators) are in the best position to discover the domains of R&D and innovation in 
which a region is likely to excel given its existing capabilities and productive assets.10 For 
many regions and countries it may be the case that the most important « innovations » are 
not technical but instead consist in the revelation of the particular business orientation that 
currently should be pursued in directed inventive and innovative activities.11 Thus, it may 
entail a novel matching of existing scientific and technical knowledge with the industrial 
resources and capabilities of a specific region in a way that advances the former in regionally 
relevant industrial direction. 
For example, some entrepreneurs in the Finnish pulp and paper industry considered 
nanotechnology to be a promising source of valuable application innovations, and firms in 
this industry were taking steps to assess this potentiality. Some pulp and paper companies 
responded to this perceived opportunity by increasing their overall internal R&D investments, 
which were aimed not only at implementing available technologies but also exploring recent 
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advances in areas of nanotechnology and biotechnology.12 Here the process of “discovery” 
achieves locally directed private sector R&D due to the initiative of entrepreneurs who 
identify and reveal a novel approach to modernising their industrial processes.  
Because of the importance of entrepreneurial experiments and discovery, there is no 
contradiction between a smart specialisation policy and a policy oriented towards 
entrepreneurship, young innovative firms and the openness of society. On the contrary, 
these two policies are mutually reinforcing: without strong entrepreneurship, the strategy of 
smart specialisation will fail because of a deficit of the entrepreneurial knowledge needed to 
feed and nurture this strategy.  
But another extremely important point is that such emphasis on entrepreneurial discovery 
should not result in narrowing the scope of policy intervention that is needed to address 
market and coordination failures that otherwise are likely to impede the transition from an 
initial discovery to a cluster of activities giving rise to a new domain of R&D and innovation 
specialisation. Emphasizing the role of entrepreneurial discovery is not, as we see it, a plea 
in favour of a laissez-faire philosophy. 
 
3.3 - Imitative entry and imperfect appropriation of the initial discovery 
Market failures restrict the process of entrepreneurial discovery due to the imperfect 
appropriation of the knowledge produced by these entrepreneurs. Indeed, imitative entry is a 
key ingredient of smart specialisation so that agglomeration externalities can be realized: a 
discovery like that of Pierre-Hyacinthe Caseaux may very quickly result in a multiplication of 
« entries » into the new activity. This raises a “knowledge appropriation” issue: unless there 
are great competitive advances of taking the lead, pioneer entrepreneurs will not be able to 
capture a significant fraction of the social value of their initial investment because others will 
be free to follow.  Consequently, there is a risk that not enough agents and organisations will 
imitatively invest in this particular new line of enterprise to realize social efficiencies of 
industrial scale and agglomeration externalities. Since imitative entry is desirable for its 
competitive effects in pushing market prices towards marginal costs, the correction of 
imperfect appropriation raises well recognized and difficult policy problems that we address 
below. 
 
3.4 - Structural evolution 
As already stressed, the discovery that drives the process of smart specialisation is not about 
a simple innovation but generates knowledge about the future economic value of a possible 
structural change. In the Morez story the whole process gives rise to a transition from an old, 
declining activity to a new one. Transition is one pattern of structural changes that a smart 
specialisation strategy is likely to generate: it is discovered that a new domain can emerge 
from the existing industrial commons (the collective R&D, engineering, and manufacturing 
capabilities that sustain innovation). 
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But other patterns of structural changes are possible as the outcome of the smart 
specialisation process. “Modernisation” is a familiar one: it is discovered that the 
development of specific applications of a general purpose technology can have a significant 
impact in terms of efficiency and quality in an existing (perhaps traditional) sector. The 
Finnish pulp and paper industry already was cited as a case in point. But there are many 
others, such as the fishery industry’s development of ICT applications, and the agro-food 
sector’s adaptations of nanotechnologies.  In all these instances, the intersection between 
the available resource base of a mature activity within a region’s economy and the 
potentiality for the modernisation and “renewal” of that industry -- by applications of GPT 
application that enhances its efficiency and productivity quality, defines feasible spaces to 
pursue smart specialisation strategies. In such “spaces of opportunity” entrepreneurial 
experiments and discoveries can be expected to produce socially useful knowledge, the 
commercial application of which may need to be induced, initiated and supported by public 
action.    
A third pattern of structural changes is about regional diversification through the development 
of a new line of productive activity.  Here the “discovery” is concerns potential synergies 
(economies of scope, spillovers) that are likely to materialise between an existing branch of 
economic activity that is already well-established and another that is new and still under-
developed.  Synergies between them generally will render the flux of resources towards the 
new activity attractive and profitable, and private entrepreneurial initiatives supported by 
existing financial intermediaries therefore may be sufficient to successfully exploit the 
economic opportunities through R&D and the launching of start-ups.  In the absence of 
connections with sophisticated and technologically informed universal banks in the region, or 
links to external venture capital firms, the already established activity in the synergetic pair 
would need, directly or indirectly to be the source of finance for the necessary investments. 
But, if a national or regional government is drawing heavily upon the firms in that industry for 
general tax revenues, a smart specialisation strategy might require new fiscal measures in 
support of private-public partnership arrangements to find the capital need to realize the 
socially beneficial synergies.   
A fourth pattern involves the radical formation within the region of an entirely new and distinct 
domain of enterprise. Here the “discovery” is that R&D and innovation in a certain field have 
the potential to create activities that will be progressive and commercial attractive within the 
content of the regional economy, whereas previously they were not so.  Such radical 
foundation involves the co-emergence of an R&D/innovation activity and the related (and 
future) business activity. Although some relevant assets exist and might be mobilised by the 
prospect of exploiting a highly profitable market niche that is unlikely to attract 
entrepreneurial attention from other quarters, the absence of an adequate industrial base 
supporting private sector R&D makes it difficult for a knowledge-intensive activity related to 
those assets to emerge spontaneously. The “innovative revelation” in such seemingly 
unpromising circumstances is  that R&D resources and management experience from 
outside the region may be combined with local expertise to form a new node of activity based 
on indigenous assets, and that the new line of business could become commercially viable 
and beneficial for the entire regional economy.  A good case in point here is the development 
of IT applications for the management and maintenance of archaeological, cultural and 
environmental patrimonies, and the diffusion of knowledge about them as salient attractions 
for a sustainable tourist industry.   
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4 - Information and coordination failures and policy  
As stressed above, the short story of Morez should not be taken as a plea in favour of a 
laissez-faire policy on the grounds that governments cannot pick winning locales. Certainly 
the main issue to be addressed by policy is not “what to do” but “how to help agents to 
discover what to do and how to implement the policy according to what has been 
discovered”. Policy makers have to allow and help economic agents to find their own ways in 
a decentralised and bottom-up process and then carefully observe what is happening. They 
have to aggregate the decentralised information generated by entrepreneurial experiments 
and discoveries, assess the outcome and help the most promising projects to grow. We have 
qualified the Morez story -- which is about a small town becoming a world-class centre for the 
design and manufacture of eye-glasses -- as a low probability event.  This means that the 
main policy issue is to identify which structural conditions and policies in a specific region 
would increase the likelihood that there would be one or more new industrial (and/or service) 
localisations appearing and surviving within the next 20 years.   
 
4.1 – “Top- down” vs. “bottom-up”: a false dichotomy 
The policy process is complex: on the one hand, the principle of entrepreneurial discovery is 
essential, but on the other hand the constraints this imposes should not be used to justify a 
shrinking of policy scope to exclude all governmental actions as being “top-down directions,” 
inimical to the “bottom-up” logic of entrepreneurial discover.   This familiar “top down” versus 
“bottom up” dichotomy is itself the source of crippling policy constraints, because it is utterly 
fails to capture either the economic requirements or the political logic of smart specialisation 
as a developmental process. Policy programs fostering smart specialisation need to be more 
sophisticated than thinking within the confines of this dichotomy will allow; they call for a bi-
directional iterative dynamic, in which public measures are taken to 
(i) identify entrepreneurial discoveries; 
(ii) support, and possibly channel those initiatives in certain directions through a 
variety of incentive mechanisms, including conditional subsidies;  
(iii) monitor and assess -- in interaction with private sector stake-holders and 
independent parties -- the progress of the “the experiments,” and thereby; 
(iv) disseminate and guide the formation of a shared strategic vision of the future 
course of exploitation of the region’s emerging opportunities for specialisation; 
(v) identify and address potential coordination failures, so that a few discoveries 
are likely to become real and solid drivers for regional economic growth; 
(vi) monitor and reassess the degree to which the shared strategic vision is being 
realized, the effectiveness of measures addressing coordination failures, the 
impacts on the region’s economy, and the sustainability of the development 
without continuing public support. 
 
4.2 – The three main phases of the smart specialisation policy process 
In the foregoing schema there are three main phases of policy focus, each of which is 
associated with the deployment of a distinctive array of policy instruments. We elaborate on 
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these under the following sub-headings: identification and reinforcement of entrepreneurial 
discovery, monitoring and assessment, coordination and complementary investment.  
Identification and reinforcement of entrepreneurial discovery: 
The first phase involves facilitating development in the economy of knowledge-intensive 
activities that generate experimentation and discoveries by entrepreneurial agents.  Markets 
characterised by economic and regulatory barriers to entry and by lengthy and punitive 
bankruptcy proceedings, and judicial and political contexts that militate against neutrality in 
the legal enforcement of private contracts, are climates that are inimical to the translation of 
entrepreneurial discoveries of profit opportunity into bases for sustainable legal enterprise. 
Only when those fundamental impediments are removed will it be sensible to move on to 
deal with the more subtle problem of the weakening of entrepreneurial incentives that can 
result from the prospect that those discovering new opportunities for commercially viable 
lines of business are not likely to be able to completely appropriate the social benefits that 
flow from exploitation of such discoveries. 
This, however, is not an impediment to entrepreneurial discovery that should be removed by 
extending statutory or other blanket forms of legal protection to entrepreneurial ideas, and 
such suggestions can be no part of smart specialisation policies. Encouragement of imitative 
entry, after all, constitutes a key ingredient of smart specialisation, and the sooner the better 
in order that agglomeration externalities can be realized: the discovery of a potential domain 
in which a region could become a leader should quickly result in a multiplication of « entries » 
in the new activity.  It is thus important to provide incentives to compensate for the risky 
nature of entrepreneurial search and discovery activities without granting the “discoverers” 
monopolies in the rights to use (and/or prevent others from using) the new business 
opportunities that they may uncover. 
Indeed, an important function of public policy should be to assure diffusion of the knowledge 
regarding the value of a new activity for future specialisation, and thereby hasten to generate 
collective emulation and imitative commercial exploitation of the growth potentialities of the 
region’s new domain of specialisation.13 The policy instruments that are likely to prove 
effective here involve various forms of public-private partnership, ranging from direct public 
funding of entrepreneurial projects to collaborations at national laboratories between firms 
and government scientists as well as prizes and bonus mechanisms.14  It may prove useful 
to draw inspiration from some historical examples where a prize was awarded to inventors, 
the amount of which was calculated according to the importance of the diffusion (imitative 
entry) of the invention.15  
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But building such an economy of intensive activities regarding entrepreneurial experiments 
and discoveries requires not only combatting the so-called “incomplete appropriability 
problem” that confronts pioneers, but also creating conditions for multiple micro-systems of 
experiments and discoveries to emerge.  To use the argument advanced by David and 
Metcalfe,16 the performance of entrepreneurs and leading firms in creating new business 
enterprises depends principally upon the extent and quality of the web of connections they 
form with counterparties within established complementary organisations – research 
universities, specialised suppliers of materials and equipment, financial intermediaries, 
prospective “lead users”, and reliable candidate firms to provide a “second source” in filling 
significantly large contract orders.  Taking view, the central task, indeed, perhaps the central 
challenge for smart specialisation policy is to assist in the formation and effective alignment 
of these crucial inter-organisational connections, and to developing public sector capabilities 
and mechanisms that support the coordination of complementary early efforts by private 
agents in the sphere of experimentation and discovery. 
An illustration of a proactive policy to boost experiments and discoveries while encouraging 
connections among economic agents is one that would use of “research service vouchers” 
as an incentive mechanism. Vouchers (credit notes) could be provided to firms to 
commission an R&D project from a public research institution or any specialised R&D 
organisation.  Depending on sectoral contexts and local circumstances, the allocation of 
vouchers could be made conditional on projects that undertook to explore the commercial 
viability of certain line of business that had been identified ex ante, through a formal 
“foresight” process. That process would involve members of the region’s business 
community, and public institutions and local governmental agencies. By means of this 
incentive and an evaluation of the appropriateness of the match between particular projects 
and the alternative structural modes of evolution that have been described above 
(modernisation, transition, diversification, radical foundation, see sect. 3.4) policy-makers 
considering the region’s resource strengths and deficiencies and pursuing a smart 
specialisation strategy could elicit the emergence of a focused portfolio of particularly 
promising entrepreneurial explorations. Subsequent decisions and choices -- such as 
whether to provide public guidance and material support the further development of one or 
another particular domain of future specialisation – should of course be made with reference 
to the quality of the entrepreneurial “discoveries” that ensue (assisted by the use of the R&D 
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vouchers), and the social marginal opportunity cost of the resources that were being 
committed.17  
Assessment:  
The second phase involves assessing the outcome so that the support of a particular line of 
business will not be discontinued too early nor continued so long that subsidies are wasted 
on non-viable projects. Of course, ex ante assessment of the future value of any regional 
R&D specialisation is a quasi-impossible task. But simple criteria at least should be 
considered, including the potential magnitude of the new branch of production (i.e. the 
relative importance in the economy of the direct and indirect resource inputs from both the 
private and public sector suppliers), its likely effects upon the region’s trade balance, 
aggregate employment and professional and skilled workforce, and its finance requirements.  
The extent to which the proposed domains of enterprise will stimulate R&D activities that 
overlap with one another, and link with the scientific and technical knowledge base of 
existing lines of activity in the region and those of its close trade partners, also is an 
important dimension to be considered in evaluating its potentialities to create beneficial “spill-
overs” and opportunities for future structural change.18  
Once such an assessment has been made, pursuit of smart specialisation policy calls for the 
rapid formulation and dissemination of a strategic vision of the key directions for near-term 
development of the regional economy; a vision that is to be elaborated more concretely on 
the basis of decentralised, market-driven experiments and discoveries and shared among all 
the actors in the economy.  While it is critically important in avoiding coordination failures to 
have created shared positive expectations concerning the new directions in which investment 
will flow, realistic appraisal of what can be achieved, and avoidance of excessive optimism is 
perhaps even more important in preserving the longer-term credibility of the process.  On the 
first few implementations of the smart specialisation process especially, to have over-
promised and neglected to  disseminate explicit appraisals of the risks and potential 
economic losses and then  fallen far short of expectations in the realisation of “the vision,”  
would leave a burdensome legacy for any future efforts.   
Coordination and complementary investment: 
 The third phase involves the support and strengthening of the emerging trends so that the 
most promising projects can grow and become solid drivers for regional economic growth. 
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But most projects with the potential to give rise to a new activity require simultaneous large-
scale investments to be made in order to become profitable.19 All the necessary services and 
complementary activities have fixed costs and are unlikely to start unless service and other 
input providers have enough positive expectations regarding the future of the smart 
specialisation strategy. Profitable new activities can fail to develop unless upstream and 
downstream investments are made concurrently. 
 How does one help solve this problem in a “generic” fashion that does not turn into a 
government subsidy for the development of a specific industry in a specific region? This is 
one instance of a broader class of difficult issues that often vex development experts at 
international organisations like the World Bank. Possibly a useful resolution in this case is to 
be found in relinquishing the idea that good policy lies in finding a “golden mean” (or, “an 
interior optimum”, as economists might put it) that would avoid both the extreme of planning 
and that of laissez faire. Instead, one might look for temporary phases in the process of 
smart specialisation where pro-active “industrial policy” measures are warranted in the 
tradition of classic infant industry protection aimed at altering a region’ comparative 
advantage before resuming trade liberalization. An implication of that approach is that careful 
attention should be given to designing accompanying mandatory periodic reviews of the 
subsidies provided under such measures, and an irrevocable “sunset” date for entire 
program.   
The most obvious coordination measures to consider are those that would provide specific 
complementary public goods – such as programs of further education, pre-competitive R&D  
and tax credits or other subsidies for on-the-job training in relevant skill domains where these 
are not present elsewhere in the regional economy.  Also included under this heading is 
public support for the provision of adequate supply-responses (in human capital formation 
and research) to the new “knowledge needs” of traditional industries that are starting to adapt 
and apply a GPT, which might take the form of subsidising expenditures to gain access to 
problem-solving expertise from researchers in an external, technologically leading region. 
Local firms that have been deemed eligible for such subsidies on the basis of their business 
plans to pursue opportunities in the new line of regional specialisation should be under some 
obligation to disclose (for publication by the government authority administering the subsidy 
programs) the principle generic features of their respective business plans.20   
Not all regions would need to go through all three phases. A few (leading) regions already 
have attained “supercritical” density levels in their endowments of entrepreneurial talent and  
R&D capabilities so that the exploration and “discovery” processes are ongoing, and a 
sufficient stream of up-to-date information about the value of future opportunities for the 
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region already is percolating through the region’s business communities.  In other regions, 
“the industrial knowledge commons” (the local collectively shared knowledge about relevant 
technologies and engineering practices associated with the conduct of existing industries and 
services) will be rich, generating a basis for assessing resources that may be deployed in a 
transition to, and evolution of new possible lines of specialization. In such conditions, the 
policy process can be initiated with tasks associated with phase 2.  Entrance into that phase, 
however, may not be so easy, because since so many experiments and discoveries are 
already underway spontaneously that to identify and taking stock of them, let alone to 
property filter and assess the outcomes and compose a strategic vision, will require strong 
capacities of observation, aggregation and interpretation by the agency responsible for those 
tasks. 
In many other cases – where the region in question is relatively poor in its capacities for 
entrepreneurial discovery, the process of smart specialization needs to start in phase 1. But it 
cannot be supposed that the locally available experience base and the public sector’s human 
resources will automatically be available to initiate it, or to access the most useful sources of 
external expertise.  Consequently, individual regions should not be left entirely on their own 
to embark upon this new policy approach.  As much as one wishes to discourage blindly 
mimetic procedures and “group think” among policy-makers across the communities of the 
EU, or within the strata of the OECD members that are at similar stages of industrial 
development, there does appear to be some useful role that could be served by creating 
information platforms on which regional and local policy-making experiences could be 
shared, and searchable, up-to-date rosters of expertise could be provided by trans-national 
agencies and international organizations such as the World Bank.     
 
5.  Conclusion: “Focussing change by developing unique 
experience-based knowledge”  
A specialisation strategy is smart in two senses: 
- The specialisation is about knowledge resources and seeks not only the 
concentration of resources but also to direct and focus it upon an area of knowledge 
acquisition an experience-based expertise that complements other relevant regional 
resources. Smart specialisation thus involves both a logic of concentration and a logic 
of particularisation of a region’s knowledge assets.  Fortunately, the peculiar 
properties of GPTs such as information technologies greatly facilitate the 
opportunities open to regions to develop productive, particularised niches for 
themselves in the global knowledge economy --  including “followers” in 
industrialisation that are equipped with the basic technical tools and human skills in 
how these can be used, if only to begin the process by accessing external expertise.  
- The policy process follows a complex and iterative logic that cannot be described 
either as essentially “top down” or essentially “bottom up’. This bi-directional dynamic 
process is one in which the principle of entrepreneurial discovery plays an essential 
role and yet does not minimise the importance of public policy interventions at several 
distinct stages in the identification, evaluation and targeted support for new, emerging 
lines of regional specialisation. 
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Finally, some explicit closing words may be in order about what smart specialisation is not.  
It is not the same thing as a cluster policy.  Of course, generating a vibrant innovative cluster 
is a classic outcome; one might say “an emergent property” of a smart specialisation policy 
applied to a particular region for purely local economic interests (especially those of the 
owners of immoveable assets in the locale).  Smart specialisation as a policy process, 
however, also exhibits “efficiency properties” at the system level --i.e. for an integrated 
regional system as a whole, such as the EU.  By contrast, regional cluster policies generally 
resist fundamental change and reorientations, and, when promoted and initiated with support 
from a central development agency they are likely even to accentuate strongly mimetic 
programs of local and national industrial development.  The latter results tends to foster 
knowledge base standardisation, wasteful duplication of R&D efforts and dissipation of the 
potential agglomeration economies at  the system level – as a multiplicity of imitative local 
government authorities compete to attract the small finite pool of mobile capital, management 
and knowledge resources. 
Smart specialisation, on the other hand, involves the discovery of what makes a local 
knowledge base original and somewhat unique. Therefore, a commitment to smart 
specialisation strategies  can promote greater diversity of areas of knowledge and expertise 
within the system, thereby rendering the entire economy more able to enjoy the benefits of 
distinct local agglomeration economies and less vulnerable to both supply and demand 
shocks emanating in global markets.  
